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This article deals with the formal semantics of natural language sentences expressing
judgments of personal taste. While in sentences like Avocados are tasty for John (1)
the “judge” — i.e., the person who evaluates the object at issue— is made explicit, the
judge remains implicit in simple sentences like Avocados are tasty (2). “Contextualists”
assume that predicates like tasty are really binary, as they appear to be in (1), and
that the missing argument in (2) is supplemented by the context. “Relativists”, on the
other hand, assume that predicates of personal taste like tasty are always monadic ones.
For them the truth-values of sentences expressing judgments of personal taste depend
on a judge parameter in the same way as the truth-values of formulas of modal logic
depend on a possible-world parameter or that of tense logic on a time parameter. The
“argument from binding” —alluded to in the article’s title— is a line of reasoning put
forward by the contextualist in order to support her/his position. The argument starts
from the observation that occurrences of the adjective tasty may be bound by a natural
language quantifier as, e.g., in the sentence Everyone got something tasty (3) which can
be understood as expressing that everyone at issue got something which was tasty for her
or him. For the contextualist, this proves tasty to be a binary relation (x is tasty for y)
whose second argument position in sentence (3) is bound by the initial quantifier. Hence
the contextualist concludes the predicate to be binary in sentences (2) and as well.
The contextualist-relativist-distinction drawn by Zeman is explicated by him in more
formal terms within a Kaplan-style two-stage approach to semantics [cf. Themes from
Kaplan, 481–564, Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1989]. In Kaplan’s semantics expres-
sions have “characters” which are functions mapping contexts to “contents”. A context
is a complexes of various factors— such as, e.g., the time and place of utterance, the
speaker, etc. The content of an expression in a context c is that what is communicated
by it given the conditions specified by c. Thus, for instance, the content of a sentence
in c would be a proposition which is construed by Kaplan as a function mapping times
and possible worlds to truth values. More generally, contents are functions from “circum-
stances of evaluation” to suitable denotations: e.g., truth-values in the case of sentences
or individuals in the case of terms. Simplifying somehow Zeman’s characterization of
contextualism and relativism, one may say that a semantician taking a contextualist at-
titude towards an expression E assumes that the (in a pre-theoretical sense) contextual
factors by which E influences the truth-value of “simple” sentences in which it occurs are
“content-determinative” (p. 158) whereas the relativist takes them to be “circumstance-
determining” (p. 158). Simple sentences, as defined by Zeman (p. 158), are sentences
which contain neither indexicals (expressions referring to the context) nor phrases (like,
e.g., for John in (1)) which modify co-occurring phrases by delivering an argument ex-
pression to them.
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So the problem here is how the contextual factors which influence an expression’s
impact upon the truth-values of sentences in which it occurs are to divided into com-
ponents of the context (in the technical sense) on the one hand and circumstances of
evaluation on the other. However, the question is not just whether such a factor is a
context component or belongs to the circumstances of evaluation since there may be an
overlap between them in both Kaplan’s original framework for his logic of demonstratives
and Zeman’s treatment of predicates of personal taste. Zeman discusses this question of
overlap at some length at the beginning of his article; cf. p. 156f. He ultimately argues
that the distinction between components of the context and circumstances of evaluation
is exclusive on the level of simple sentences (as just defined). Nevertheless he (as already
said) explicitly states for his semantics of predicates of personal taste that a judge is
both a component of the context and one of the circumstances of evaluation as well;
cf. p. 171. Thus his statement concerning simple sentences can only be interpreted as
saying that only one of the two “judge-factors”, either the “judge circumstance” or the
“judge of the context” can be operative in the semantic interpretation of those sentences
though both are present in the general semantic framework for some reason or other.
The issue separating in Zeman’s view of the affair relativists from contextualists may be
then formulated as follows. Let E be an expression and a an assignment specifying values
for the variables (or, rather, the variable-like natural language expressions) occurring in
E. Let, furthermore, c be a context and jc the judge specified by it; and let finally w
(possible world) and j (judge) be circumstances of evaluation (j need not be identical
with jc). Assume then that in order to determe the denotation |E|a,c,w,j of E under a
at c relative to w and j one has to know who the judge is. Should one then chose j or
rather jc? Zeman’s point in his article is that in the case of predicates of personal taste
the argument from binding does not decide the matter in favour of jc. A predicate like
tasty need not be interpreted as an implicitly binary predicate to which the context c
at issue delivers its component jc as an argument. Instead we may take that predicate
as a monadic one—as its occurrence in (2) suggests. When, as in the cases of (1) and
(3), a reference to the judge is made this is done by employing the judge-circumstance
of evaluation.
Hence Zeman proposes to identify the content |tasty|a,c of the adjective tasty under
the variable assignment a (which is redundant here since tasty is a constant) in context c
with the function λwj.λx.[x is tasty in w for j]. Since this function is independent of c, it
is also the content of the adjective in any other context c′. Consequently, the proposition
λwj.[Avocados are tasty in w for j] expressed by (2) according to the relativist position
would then be the same in each context and sentence (2) would have what Kaplan calls
a “stable” character. On the premises of the contextualist hypothesis, however, |tasty|a,c
would be λwj.λx.λy.[x is tasty for y in w] and the proposition expressed by (2), namely
λwj.λx.λy.[x Avocados are tasty for jc in w], would depend on the context c. Hence
sentence (2) would express different propositions in different contexts and thus have a
variable character. The special type of context-dependency of the adjective tasty renders
it thus content-determinative.
The problem for the relativist is to show how explicit information concerning the judge
as in (1) can be combined with her/his analysis of predicates of personal taste as monadic
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ones. For this Zeman employs François Recanati’s idea of “variadic functions” [Literal
Meaning, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, (pp. 107–109)]. A variadic
function is an higher-order function which changes the arity of its lower-order argument.
Zeman conceives of the denotation (relative to context c and judge j) of the preposi-
tion for occurring in (1) as a variadic function |for|a,c,w,j = λx.λf.λy.[f(y) ∧ x = j]
which maps objects x, unary functions f from objects to truth-values, and objects y
to the truth-value f(y) ∧ x = j. Letting then |John|a,c,j,w = John, the denotation of
the prepositional phrase for John is |for|a,c,j,w(|John|a,c,j,w) = λf.λy.[f(y) ∧ John = j].
Finally, the denotation of the predicate phrase tasty for John is λf.λy.[f(y) ∧ John =
j](|tasty|a,c,w,j) = λy.[|tasty|a,c,w,j(y)∧j = John]. According to the above given relationist
explanation of |tasty|a,c, this is the function λy.[y is judged tasty for j in w ∧ j = John]
thus λy.[y is judged tasty for John in w].
In order to derive a semantic representation of sentence (3) along similar lines, Zeman
makes use of two additional hypotheses: (A) he assumes that, on some level of linguistic
description accessible to the rules of semantic interpretation, sentence (3) contains an
implicit for -phrase differing from the for -phrase in (1) only by having an empty (phonet-
ically null) argument contributing a variable ranging over judges instead of a noun phrase
denoting such a judge. (B) He assumes furthermore that the rules of semantic interpre-
tation implement a mechanism which allows the quantifier Everyone to bind both the
variable occupying the subject argument place of got and the variable introduced by the
empty element of the for -phrase; cf. the pattern of occurrences of the variable “x” in the
ad-hoc first-order rendering ∀x.[Person(x)→ ∃y.[Thing(y)∧Got(x, y)∧Tasty For(x, y)]]
of (3). Problems arising from (B) are discussed by Zeman in the last section of his paper
in which he defends his analysis.
One will admit that Zeman is able to derive plausible semantic representations of
sentences like (1), (2), and (3) on relativistic premises. Given this, however, the question
arises why a context c in Zeman’s framework still has to contain a judge jc. After all,
for the relativist there seems to be nothing like a “personal taste indexical” which would
make such a component of the context necessary.
Reviewed by Klaus Robering
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